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ABSTRACT
The seventeenth century was a time when large economic transformations
had direct consequences on people’s everyday lives. Increased economic
pressure was put on rural populations, which affected their
management of the resources that they owned in common. This paper
examines how peasant communities managed commonly owned forests
in Finland during the seventeenth century. The focus is placed on North
Ostrobothnia, where large-scale tar production and widespread timber
cutting took place to meet the growing need of European states for
forest products. Through the study of district court protocols, this article
analyses how peasant communities responded to and coped with the
new economic climate of the period while local authorities enforced
royally sanctioned restrictions and outside interest groups raised
demands on what the peasantry could provide. Consequently, the
peasantry formalised previously informal rules, regulated cutting
activities in relation to the taxable capacity of the peasant households,
and re-established borders, which offset privatisation.
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Introduction
Notwithstanding harsh conditions, such as war, a cold climate, and state control, the seventeenth
century was a time in Swedish history that observed great societal transformations with profound
consequences for people’s everyday life. The many and exhaustive conscriptions from the peasant
population radically affected the family structure in rural areas. The state’s expanding resource
mobilisation altered the ways in which people found sustenance and work, and Sweden’s inter-
national trade networks and exports expanded significantly. The new political and economic climate
also boosted the iron, copper, and tar industries, which soon became indispensable sources of
income for the Swedish state.1 The latter of these commodities was produced at an accelerating
rate in Finland (then a part of the Swedish realm) throughout the century and became the dominant
region supplying European states with tar, which was sorely needed due to its water-resistant prop-
erties. As a consequence, forests and woodlands became more significant, which led to an increas-
ingly integrated and complex peasant economy, while economic pressures from the Swedish state
also grew steadily. This would make a lasting imprint on peasant communities in Finland where
as much as 76 percent of the Swedish tar was produced, out of which 43 percent was exported
from the Ostrobothnia region in 1686 (Villstrand, 1992).
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Ostrobothnia’s forests have attracted the attention of historians, who have illuminated the peasant
population’s engagement with tar production and widespread forest cutting, as well as the societal,
political, and environmental conditions that made this a growing industry during the seventeenth
century (Alho, 1968; Virrankoski, 1973; Villstrand, 1992). However, these activities, which include
the management and regulation of natural resources, have not yet been put into the context of his-
torical commons. The interest in exploring the diverse histories of commons in Europe has grown
considerably in recent decades, and this article is a contribution to this field of research. The purpose
of the article is to explain how the peasant population in North Ostrobothnia responded to inten-
sified economic and societal pressures during the seventeenth century and how the management
of forest commons was affected by increasing levels of resource utilisation. Although the scale of
tar production ultimately moved the resource frontier in the region, the institutional framework
of the peasantry management system helped offset privatisation and facilitated the maintenance
of a collective utilisation of forest commons throughout the century. These institutions would endure
for another century before finally being privatised.
I will begin by discussing the current state of research on commons and forest utilisation in pre-
modern Europe and introduce the area of study. The results of the analysed source material will then
be presented, ending with concluding remarks on their significance and contribution to the field of
historical commons and forest industry during the seventeenth century.
Management of common lands
Garret Hardin’s article ‘Tragedy of the commons’ (1968) initiated a debate over whether commonly
owned resource systems were doomed fail, as propagated by Hardin, or not. His contention has since
been disproven many times, not least by Elinor Ostrom in her seminal work on common-pool
resources (CPRs) (1990). When studying such ownership structures, it is important to consider
the conditions that frame the use of the resources in question. To this end, there are different dimen-
sions, such as the resource itself and the users. What overarches and interlinks them is the common-
pool institution (CPI) they create (de Moor, 2015). These institutions can be defined as containing
the rules and norms through which people organise their economic, social, political, and cultural
activities – or in the spirit of Douglas North: the rules of the game (North, 1990). These norms
and rules are essential to how commons are managed since they influence and, in many ways, deter-
mine whether stable and long-term CPR is achievable (Ostrom, 1990, p. 30).
Research on commons across the European continent has resulted in a realisation that communal
property regimes played a larger and more important role in pre-modern societies than previously
assumed. Whereas the effects of privatisation and enclosure have been of special interest in earlier
research, much can now be said about the longevity and robustness of CPRs and about the driving
forces and motivations of common-pool regimes in historical time (de Moor, Shaw-Taylor, &
Warde, 2002; de Moor, 2009; Hersperger & Bürgi, 2009; Szabó, 2010; de Moor, 2015; Grüne,
2011; Ongaro, 2016). The benefits of enclosure have mainly been argued to be an issue of pro-
ductivity and cost-efficiency. However, it has been shown in many places that CPRs provided low
transaction costs and advantages of scale and balanced the levels of inequality in local communities
(de Moor, 2009; Beltrán Tapia, 2015: Beltrán Tapia, 2016). Whereas legal frameworks differed across
Europe, the motivations for maintaining commons were similar in many places. They provided stab-
ility in the form of collective action in matters of maintenance and monitoring, risk sharing, and cre-
ated a sense of communality in the face of growing market forces (de Moor, 2015). Other aspects,
such as use rights, have been shown to be similar in English and Italian commons, and the traditional
customs of regulation for the collection of resources for fuel consumption were also comparable in
local communities in the Netherlands, Germany, and Scandinavia (Winchester, 2015).
Regulation of users and use rights were, however, not constant but were subject to changes necess-
ary to accommodate fluctuating economic and political forces. Nor were the commons immune to
privatisation. A trend of adapting to new economic and political conditions was observed, which
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ultimately led to the dismantling of commons primarily during the nineteenth century. However,
local communities were until that point able to offset enclosure by motivating collective action
through institutionalisation and by adjusting management to the changing societal environment
(Szabó, 2010; de Moor, 2015; De Keyzer, 2018). Studies on village communities in southwestern
Germany during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have, for example, shown that a modern-
isation (but not dismantling) of commons management was needed for the consolidation of village
communities (Grüne, 2011). Other examples of slowing down the rate of privatisation have been linked
to the geographical properties of the region in question, for instance, in eighteenth century Spain (Bel-
trán Tapia, 2015). Whereas the word ‘modernization’ implies innovation and new methods of regu-
lation, this article will argue for the importance of the ‘formalization’ of pre-existing rules as
economic and political pressure was put on rural communities. This strategy was employed in the Cam-
pine area in early modern Belgium and the Netherlands, where use rights to pasture land and the foun-
dation of the CPI were formalised while regulation remained more informal (De Keyzer, 2018).
Even though much of Europe’s forests were ultimately cut down, large areas of woodlands were
successfully preserved, for instance, in Italy, through various forms of cooperation within local com-
munities (Ongaro, 2016), whereas other strategies, such as effective use of accounting and bookkeep-
ing, strengthened communality and facilitated sustainability in rural Spain (Lana-Berasain, 2017). In
mountainous alpine areas and in the northeastern parts of France, forests were preserved through the
establishment of bylaws (Vivier, 2002). In northwestern Germany in the Westphalian region of Hau-
berge, forests were parcelled into different ‘fields’ that were used in rotation, which managed to meet
the growing needs of the iron industries and the agricultural sector from the late Middle Ages to the
late nineteenth century (Brakensiek, 2002). A study on revolutionary France and the region of
Franche-Comté has provided further evidence of how common property regimes were successful
and created rich biodiversity, thus challenging the notion held within earlier research that these
arrangements were to blame for the depletion of France’s forests (Matteson, 2015). The Finnish
case will provide yet another example of how common property regimes motivated cooperation
as market forces and state intervention grew considerably during the seventeenth century.
Forests in the Swedish realm
Large parts of the early modern Swedish kingdom were covered with forests, and a large number of
peasant households were located in such areas, although they were dominant in the north together
with in Finland (Larsson, 1996; Svensson, 1998; Gadd, 2000). Unlike the village’s infields (inägojord),
forests were often situated further away in the village’s outlaying lands (utmark). It was here that
peasants got their building timber, firewood, wood for fences, and materials for equipment and
tools. It was also here that they cut the pine trees (Pinus sylvestris) needed to make tar. As the
demand for forest resources increased, the structure of peasant households changed to support stable
and continuous production. This stood in stark contrast to the peasantry’s otherwise agriculturally
driven household economy in the sense that it affected the ways in which peasants structured their
daily work. Since the forests were collectively owned up until the land reforms of the middle and late
eighteenth century, the organisation of extracting resources was vital, as were the rules concerning
access and the sanctions against violations.
The historiography of Swedish forests during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been
concerned with the expanding iron and copper industries in and around the district of Bergslagen
(Karlsson, 1990; Sjöberg, 1996; Bladh, 1997; Eliasson, 1997; Ågren, 1998a). A westward expansion
of peasants and forest-consuming industries occurred here, and the commercial use of forest com-
mons increasingly complicated management structures in local communities. In Fryksdals hundred
(härad) in Värmland County in the western part of the Swedish kingdom, Staffan Granér (2002) has
shown how an increasing number of forest-related conflicts concerning access and use rights took
place between 1630 and 1750 and described a development where collective and social rights
were slowly redefined. The consumption of wood and charcoal by the ironworks industry created
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scarcity, and the pressure to enclose outlying lands intensified. However, it was a long and slow pro-
cess. Divisions of forests and outlaying lands were first done between villages and later between indi-
vidual households, and most were made in the first half of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless,
forest borders became increasingly important as violations and disputes over their whereabouts
became more frequent. The ultimate privatisation of the forests enabled peasants to more effectively
oppose the ironwork-owners’ monopoly on buying charcoal.
Another more drastic development can be noted in Viby parish in Örebro County during the
seventeenth century, where peasants’ rights to manage the utilisation of forest commons were gradu-
ally limited due to growing interest and involvement by the Swedish crown. The peasant community
ultimately lost its collective ownership in favour of the County Governor and crown officials, who
enlisted foresters to control and regulate the utilisation of both communal and private forests (Jans-
son, 2003).
The state-led regulation over the peasantry’s use of forest resources gained mandate with the
Royal Forest Ordinance of 1647, followed by several new regulations throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Similar forestry acts were decreed throughout Europe, as scarcity had
become a universally proclaimed fear, prompting widespread legislative actions to be made in the
sixteenth century and onwards (Warde, 2018). The use of forest ordinances by local courts in Sweden
was extensive, especially in the western part of Sweden, but they were liberally interpreted and
implemented differently by local courts throughout the realm (Granér, 2002). Geography and
environmental properties also affected the state’s ability to control the peasantry’s utilisation of forest
resources. This was an important factor for the pace and intensity of movements to enclose commu-
nal property (Beltrán Tapia, 2015). The results below also affected how forest ordinances were
implemented in North Ostrobothnia and the level of impact they had on the peasantry’s forest-
related activities.
Studying how commonly owned forests in North Ostrobothnia were managed will broaden our
perspective of how peasant communities reacted to the intensified economic pressures of the seven-
teenth century. While the peasants in Bergslagen and other places in central Sweden were more
directly targeted and affected by central regulation, the peasants of North Ostrobothnia enjoyed a
higher degree of autonomy. In addition, whereas the former were in a socially and economically sub-
ordinate position to the dominance of the state-supported ironwork owners, which caused ruptures
in the system for determining the level of individual households’ shares and rights to the common
(Granér, 2002), the peasants in North Ostrobothnia faced a different reality.
North Ostrobothnia
Finland was an integral part of the Swedish realm from the medieval period until the early nineteenth
century. It was not until 1809 that Sweden had to surrender Finland to Russia as a consequence of the
FinnishWar (1808–1809). Prior to this territorial loss, Finland played an important role in the Swed-
ish state because of the economic wealth extracted from its forests. The area was particularly well
suited for tar production due to the many streams and rivers of the region upon which forest
resources could easily be transported to coastal towns from remote forest areas and because the
resources could be paid to the state as tax (Alho, 1968; Villstrand, 1992; Villstrand, 1996).
Prussia was the main supplier of tar for the European market at the turn of the seventeenth cen-
tury. As demand increased, Prussia’s forests were depleted, and Finnish tar dominated the market in
the middle of the century. North Ostrobothnia (Fin: Pohjois-Pohjanmaa) extends from the Gulf of
Bothnia north of Ule Träsk (Fin: Oulujärvi) to the eastern border and covers an area of approxi-
mately 44,000 square kilometres. Tar production was an industry solely managed by peasants and
included several stages similar to the production of charcoal, although it took longer to complete.
The trees were first debarked so the trunks could collect and sweat resin. After two to four years
of continuous debarking, they were cut in the autumn and winter. The wood was split at the tar
pit and distilled the following spring. Mainly men were engaged with tar distilling; however, in
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some parts of the work process, both women and men participated, for example, when the tar wood
was stacked in a tar pit (Villstrand, 1992). Together with iron and copper, tar accounted for approxi-
mately 90 percent of Sweden’s total exports in the middle of the seventeenth century (Villstrand,
2011, p. 434). In the beginning of the century, approximately 18,700 barrels were exported annually
from Swedish Baltic Sea ports, which increased to nearly 130,000 barrels in the second half of the
century. Exports mainly went to the Netherlands and England and were thereafter introduced
further into the European market (Villstrand, 1996, pp. 62–63). Considering the massive expansion
of tar production, North Ostrobothnia should be regarded as a resource and commodity frontier as
the search for pine-rich woodlands by the tar industry and peasants expanded throughout the region,
from the coast and inland to the east.2
Sources and methodological considerations
The sources analysed in this article are court records from local district courts during the seventeenth
century, and the method of analysis was guided by Ostrom’s criteria for how such resource systems
are achieved (Ostrom, 1990). These records were suitable for a number of reasons. Assembling three
times per year, the court was the place where people went to discuss and resolve conflicts that could
not be solved elsewhere or by other means, and they provided accounts on how regulations were
introduced for forest resources and how borders were established and formalised in the landscape.
While bylaws are not available from this time, both informal and formal constraints were succes-
sively derived from the records since they reflect the arrangement and order of the society in ques-
tion. However, it is likely that the court records only represented a portion of the total number of
conflicts and dealings concerning these issues, but they nevertheless reveal how the legal system
was used to solve matters that concerned commonly owned forests (Birrell, 1987; Larsson, 2014).
It is important to point out that while the judge was appointed by the state, he ruled together
with the laymen (nämndemän), who were twelve trusted representatives of the peasantry that
gave the court assembly a profound and close affiliation with the local community (Österberg &
Sogner, 2000; Larsson, 2016).
Results
A total of 308 cases constituted the basis for the investigation; the first was from 1628 and the last was
from 1700. They differed in severity: one case may have concerned a stolen barrel of tar, whereas
another may have concerned the regulation of use rights in parishes. Three different categories of
cases have been established: those concerning the regulation of village and parish commons (Table
1), the establishment of borders (Table 2), and cases concerning the peasantry and central institutions,
i.e. the Swedish state and burgher classes (Table 3). The development in categories one and three, as
well as the general trajectory of the total number of cases (Table 4), show a gradual increase throughout
the century, which points to a general intensification of forest-related activities in the region.3
Of particular interest is the relationship between categories one and two, that is, matters of regu-
lation and establishment of borders. A decrease in regulation matters can be noticed during the
1660s, while border matters increased. This trend was reversed during the following decade and con-
tinued to fluctuate in this manner throughout the century. This demonstrated a pattern where pea-
sants needed to re-establish and affirm the border location after a period of regulating access. The
continuous increase in the third category was principally a result of the Royal Forest Ordinances
first introduced in 1647 but more thoroughly and intensively used by local authorities from the
2For more information or resource and commodity frontiers, see Moore (2010a); Moore (2010b).
3To put this in perspective, the fleets of England, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, France, and Spain had a combined load
capacity that grew from approximately 140,000 tons in the 1650s to 400,000 during the 1680s, Villstrand (1992). Considering
this massive demand, the regulation of forest-related activities and the establishment of borders needed to be discussed to a
greater extent than before.
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1670s and onwards, as well as by the intensifying trade relations between peasants and burgher
classes, which caused tension between the two.
Internal regulations in villages and parishes
While the parish forest was generally open to free use by all parish members, regulation of the village
forest could be different, and they could be shared in different ways. It could be open to free use by
the village members, but the households could also share the forest by assigning each one their own
ancient harvest area (hävdvunnen hyggeplats). This was an unmarked although specified area where
the members of a certain household were allowed to cut (Jutikkala, 1963).4 The forest could also be
Table 1. Number of court cases concerning regulation on village and parish commons in Northern Ostrobothnia in ten-
year increments, 1621–1700.
Source: NAF, Court Records.
Table 2. Number of court cases concerning forest borders in Northern Ostrobothnia in ten-year increments, 1641–1700.
Source: NAF, Court Records.
4Such harvest areas were sometimes defined as ‘ancient forest’ (Swe: urminnes skog) in the court records. See for example Häradst-
ing, Gamlakarleby parish, 23rd, 26th, and 27th of August 1678, NAF, Court Records, KP, 1678–, QQ.1, p. 112v.
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cut in rotation (krångelvis), meaning that while members of one household were cutting in the south,
another was cutting in the north and so on (Kuusi, 1914). This would ensure that each household
was given equal opportunity to take part in the forest’s sometimes diverse biomass, which grew
unequally in different parts of the forest.5 The growing number of legal cases shows how these
areas were contested more often as the century progressed. The nature of the disputes could either
be that single individuals claimed areas of the forest that were too large, that too much had been cut,
or that resources that had already been cut were stolen.6
Table 3. Number of court cases concerning the peasantry and central institutions in Northern Ostrobothnia in ten-year
increments, 1631–1700.
Source: NAF, Court Records.
Table 4. Total number of court cases in Northern Ostrobothnia in ten-year increments, 1621–1700.
Source: NAF, Court Records 1621–1700.
5Similar ‘virtual enclosures’ were found in Nether Wasdale in England, where commoners were given a section of the common to
graze their sheep (heafs) and to collect peat and moss; these areas were unmarked and were recorded in the collective memory
of the community, Winchester (2015).
6NAF, Court Records.
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A universal principle practised across much of Western Europe was that commoners should not
appropriate more resources than was necessary to sustain one’s household (Birrell, 1987; Winche-
ster, 2015). However, where they obtained resources was also important and had consequences
for the entire village. The typical layout of a village in North Ostrobothnia was that the farms
were positioned in a sparse row along the river valleys. The infields were laid in a continuous,
elongated cropland in the direction of the river with the forest surrounding the village and infields,
facing away from the river (Jutikkala, 1963). As resource extraction became more intense, the avail-
ability of wood and the proximity of cutting activities to a neighbour’s private lands became a central
issue. Even though it was carried out on the common, villagers increasingly perceived these activities
as intrusive. Cutting too close to a neighbour’s homestead in a location that was not anyone’s ancient
harvest area meant that the offended peasant had to go further into the forest to acquire resources,
which was more time-consuming and physically demanding. The forest bordering a peasant’s private
lands was therefore often claimed to be for the inhabitants of that homestead to cut, not the neigh-
bours. However, no general rule of proximity existed prior to the expansion of tar production in the
region. The general pattern provided by the court records was that the argument of proximity was
less adhered to in the beginning and middle of the century, as infield-bordering forest areas were
generally kept open for free use by all villagers.7 This changed towards the end of the century as
it became common to argue for each villager’s right to ‘have space for forest’ close to one’s home-
stead.8 The consequences brought on by the expanded and intensified use of village forests thus
pointed to a changing awareness of decreasing forest resources.
With increased competition came the need to monitor common land to prevent overexploitation.
In England, woodwards were appointed to monitor communal forests but also in woodlands belong-
ing to the crown and private estates. Nevertheless, the prevailing customs and traditions of the local
community governed the practises. In general, those using the forest also policed it. In Denmark, the
tenants of Crown woods were themselves the wardens charged with monitoring tasks (Warde, 2018).
Similarly, in North Ostrobothnia, towards the end of the century, the constable (länsman) was often
elected to oversee the borders of the parish forest and report illicit cutting. The success of the insti-
tutional system could vary depending on several things: the layout of the geographical landscape, the
population density, and the utilisation purposes of the extracted resource.9
Given the size of North Ostrobothnia, the time that had passed before an act of illicit cutting was
noticed could vary greatly. The size of certain parishes could sometimes be substantial in relation to
the population, which further complicated the matter of detecting offences. One of the parishes along
the coast in North Ostrobothnia, Kalajoki parish, had a total land area of 4100 square kilometres. It
consisted of 15 villages with approximately 18 homesteads per village. The average land and forest
area of each village was just over 270 square kilometres and over 15 square kilometres per homestead
(or 15,000 hectares).10 It is therefore not surprising that the regulation of forest-related activities
could be hard to detect in areas far away from the village community. Generally, detection depended
on the size of the parish and each peasant’s forest-related activities in relation to the monitoring sys-
tem set in place by the community.
The formal conflict solving strategy of going to the court and having the district judge and laymen
of the community help solve disputes became increasingly important and useful for peasantry. This
7See, for example, Häradsting, Pyhäjoki parish, 20th of January 1642, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1640–44, RR.5, pp. 101–101v; Vin-
terting, Kemi parish, 13th of March 1645, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1640–44, RR.6, p. 5v; Sommarting, Kronoby parish, 3rd and
4th of August 1664, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1661–66, RR.11, pp. 558v–559.
8Vinterting, Lochteå parish, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th of September 1699, NAF, Court Records, PP, 1699–, RR.36, p. 382. Original
text: ‘hafwa uthrymme till skoog.’; see also Höstting, Gamlakarleby and Kelviå parish, 13th and 14th of November 1682, NAF,
Court Records, PPEP, 1682–, RR.19, pp. 734–735.
9In the Duchy of Württemberg, the general pattern was that the further someone lived from the residence of the forester who
watched over the common, the more likely it was that rules were not followed, see Warde (2006); Warde (2017). It is hard to
deduce with any certainty whether this applied in North Ostrobothnia as well; however, it likely did apply since most reported
offences occurred in more densely population areas where constables could more easily detect offences.
10These calculations were based on numbers provided by Villstrand (1992).
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is not surprising since reliable conflict-solving strategies were needed to sustain the longevity of a
CPR (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 2005). Informal ways of solving disputes also existed, but drawing
someone before the court had certain benefits. It meant that one’s allegations were made public,
which sometimes enabled a combination of formal and informal conflict-solving strategies to be
practised. This happened in Uleåborg and Karlö parishes in February 1692 when the two brothers
Mats and Olof Olofssöner accused Johan Koloinen of having cut tar wood without permission.
The court decided to have the matter investigated and provided a verdict later in the spring or
the forthcoming summer, upon which the three peasants left the courtroom. However, before the
court adjourned that day, they returned and announced that they had reached a settlement where
Johan would give the brothers four barrels of tar and transport the remaining tar wood to their
tar-pit, where they would distil it together.11 The informal custom within the local community,
which the three peasants had an active part in creating, made it possible to exercise social control
outside as well as inside the courtroom.
The social conditions in peasant communities were very much affected by changing economic
trends and the strategies for the organisation of work (Larsson, 1996; Sjöberg, 1996; Eliasson, 1997).
In the forest landscapes of southern Moravia in Central Europe (today the Czech Republic), for
example, the management systems were heavily influenced by tradition and socio-economic conditions
and choices (Szabó &Hédl, 2013). Introducing regulations was a way of counteracting overexploitation
and creating structure in society (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). From themid-seventeenth century, local
communities’ need for such regulations became more apparent in North Ostrobothnia. The records
showed an increasing number of occasions when informal regulations were not followed, thus prompt-
ing the need to formalise such rules in the legal context of the court, which meant a changing insti-
tutional framework where the rules of the game had been altered. What can be discerned is that the
informal rules for cutting in relation to one’s taxable capacity began to be ignored.12 This had been
a long-standing tradition, which meant that the higher the taxable capacity of the household, the
more resources that household was allowed to appropriate from the common. This system was also
practised in the western part of the Swedish kingdom, and similar arrangements existed in other places
in early modern Europe, for example, in England, northern France, Belgium, Flanders, and much of
Germany (Winchester, 2015). The pine trees in both village and parish forests were, however, cut at
a rapid rate, which ultimately moved the resource frontier deeper inland (Villstrand, 1992). As
such, maintaining it as an informal custom no longer sufficed to sustain the forests, something
which also could not be accommodated for by the replenishment rate of young growing pine trees.
The local courts were a collective-choice arena where local communities met to re-establish rules
concerning use rights and regulation in the forests. The chosen strategy was to formalise the precious
informal rule that had been practised for centuries by requesting a non-physical division of the for-
ests. This did not mean that forests were divided as the infields of a village but that the property of
each village and household owner was properly estimated and taxed with the court’s supervision and
that legal documents over its enactment were provided. This was implemented in Gamlakarleby par-
ish in mid-March 1679, which spread to the parish of Lochteå as they approximately one week later
followed suit after hearing about Gamlakarleby and other parishes’ courses of action. Similarly,
although later, in 1692, the village of Rautio in Kalajoki parish decided to obtain a formal attestation
of the extent each village member was allowed to cut. In other words, what was needed was to reduce
the uncertainty and establish consistent expectations.13
The increasing level of forest work affected the peasant economy to such a degree that the behav-
iour of individuals changed. As intensity grew, fragility also increased; this fragility was noticeable in
the parishes named above. However, growing market forces and demand for resources also had the
11Vinterting, Uleåborg and Karlö parishes, 11th, 12th, and 13th of February 1692, NAF, Court Records, PP, 1692, RR.29, pp. 215–216.
12For information on landholding and tax units, see Gadd (2011).
13Häradsting, Lochteå parish, 20th, 27th, and 28th of March 1679, NAF, Court Records, KP, 1679–, QQ.2, p. 59v, nr. 383; Vinterting,
Gamlakarleby parish, 20th, 22nd, and 24th of March 1679, NAF, Court Records, KP, 1679–, QQ.2, p. 50v; Vinterting, Kalajoki parish,
14th, 15th, and 16th of January 1692, NAF, Court Records, PP, 1692–, RR.29, p. 47.
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potential to strengthen collective identities and communality (Grüne, 2011). The measures taken in
these parishes did, however, continue as the extractive pressures from the Swedish crown continued
to grow in the second half of the century. In the autumn of 1686, peasants in Gamlakarleby, Lochteå,
and Kronoby voiced concerns that some had been excessively cutting timber in the parish forests
despite the terms determined in 1679. Those responsible confessed but added that they were com-
pelled to excessive cutting as they had been forced to deliver 1000 dozen planks of wood to the crown
on top of the 250 dozen planks they already delivered each year. This amounted to an additional 15
dozen planks per homestead. To emphasise the stressful nature of the situation, they continued to
explain that they had to hire men from the northern part of the parish to be able to meet the
quota. The parish members therefore decided to level the wood-cutting in such a manner that
those who had been cutting more during this year should cut less during the next. Additionally, if
anyone was unable to meet the quota, the responsibility of procuring the remaining planks would
be proportionately spread among the members of each parish.14
Increased competition over forest resources within local communities was difficult to overlook in
the court records. In such contexts, population growth had been found to be a contributing factor in
many places in northwestern Europe (de Moor, 2009). In North Ostrobothnia, the rural population
grew from approximately 9000–14,000 between 1654 and 1695 (Virrankoski, 1973, Table III, p. 757).
One might assume that this increase had major significance for the number of conflicts. However,
while it certainly had some level of impact, the vastness of the region in relation to the population
density should not be ascribed too much influence. The development presented here most likely had
more to do with increasing market integration and pressure from the state in the form of taxes and
conscription rather than demographic development. The development also demonstrated that pea-
sant communities were ready to take action to protect their forests, although resource scarcity did
occur in local areas. They needed to uphold a sense of unity to prevent total deforestation, an
effort that the court records showed they succeeded in maintaining.
Establishment of borders
The boundaries of village and parish forest had been unmarked for centuries in Finland and were
generally not specified unless there was a specific need. They were recorded in the collective memory
of the local community and passed on through generations (Jutikkala, 1963). Increased forest exploi-
tation led to a landscape where forests were often contested due to uncertainties over where forest
borders were located. Boundary-related conflicts were not an exclusively forest-related problem
(Jansson, 2003; Larsson, 2009), nor was they contained in North Ostrobothnia. In the parish of Lek-
sand in Dalarna County in central Sweden, contested boundaries over land use for agricultural pur-
poses often occurred, as did conflicts concerning animals trespassing on lands not belonging to their
owner (Larsson, 2014). In the county of Värmland, most conflicts concerning border violations tran-
spired between villages during the seventeenth century, whereas internal village disagreements
showed an upswing during the following century (Granér, 2002). Since the eighteenth century is
beyond the scope of this article, it is hard to say anything about the development after 1700. It is,
however, evident that legal matters both within villages and on a much broader level peaked in
the last decades of the seventeenth century, and it is possible that this trend continued (Table 4).
The court records frequently tell of instances when one or several individuals unlawfully crossed
borders to cut in another village’s forest. The perpetrator often claimed that he did not know that he
was cutting on someone else’s forest, which was not entirely surprising since physical boundaries
were seldom erected. It was, however, much more common that the accused party claimed that
the forest was within his own village border or private lands. One such example was brought up
in Kelviå parish in 1664 when the preacher Olaus Marci accused the peasant Jöns Hypä of having
14Sommarting, Kronoby, G. Karleby, and Kelviå parishes, 7th, 8th, and 9th of September 1686, NAF, Court Records, PPEP 1686–,
RR.23, pp. 559–568.
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unlawfully cut wood in the common forest. Afterwards, he had also practised slash-and-burn agri-
culture in the area. The matter had been treated by the court the year before and it was decided that
the court scribe, the constable, and a number of laymen should head out to the contested forest and
examine the matter.15 A common argument throughout the period was to refer to the ancient mem-
ory on the community (urminnes hävd, lit. ancient claim). It meant that if the circumstance that was
referred to had been established and accepted by the community for such a long time that no one
could remember it being in another way, then that circumstance was lawful. The local community
could thus provide considerable legal strength if the community’s memory supported someone’s
claim (Ågren, 1997). As mentioned earlier, this customary practice was often used to affirm the
whereabouts of individual households’ ancient harvest areas in village forests. However, it also
became a legal argument used for forest areas where no borders or mental delimitations had existed
at all. Jöns Hypä was finally found guilty on the grounds that he could not prove that he had any
exclusive right to the area. This was substantiated, as was emphasised by the court scribe, by the
fact that his claim of ancient right could not be established since no community member could
remember that there had ever been any delimitations in the area.16
Although forest borders were kept in the community’s memory and were at best marked by car-
vings on trees or stones placed in an upright position, they were regarded as inviolable and sacro-
sanct (Jutikkala, 1963). This was similar to the conditions in Hanoverian England, where parish
and village borders were regarded as sacred and to which villagers could foster an almost sentimental
bond (Fletcher, 2003). Having them inspected became increasingly common and important when
disputes over their location were brought to court. The consequences of inspections were that bor-
ders were reaffirmed, sometimes updated, but more importantly that their movability was altered.
This has been emphasised by Heather Falvey (2013) concerning the disafforestation and later enclo-
sure of Duffield Frith in England. She addressed the fluidity of borders when kept in the memory of
the local inhabitants and explained how surveyors met heated and sometimes physical resistance
from the local commoners. When asked to assist in finding the locations of the borders, they
would wilfully ‘forget’ where they were since as long as no legal document or map existed, the bor-
ders would essentially remain movable at the will of the local users. Circumstances in North Ostro-
bothnia were, however, different. Inspections were hardly ever questioned and were always requested
by the users themselves. Furthermore, contrary to the English case, inspections were not pushed by
the local authorities in North Ostrobothnia. This development can be compared with that in Berg-
slagen in central Sweden during the first part of the eighteenth century, where peasants called for
privatisation, as it would ensure more clearly defined property rights, which facilitated their struggle
against ironwork owners who, conversely, observed greater personal benefit in keeping the areas
commonly owned (Granér, 2002). However, there was never a question of privatisation in North
Ostrobothnia, but rather re-establishment of already (although mostly in memory) existing borders.
Consensus over where parish borders were located was important, and thwarting outside infrin-
gements became a unifying element that incentivised peasants to protect their forests. This sense of
communality can be observed in other well-forested regions in Europe, for example, in common for-
ests in the valleys of the eastern Italian Alps (Bonan, 2019). This was also demonstrated by a case
from 1665 when the peasants of Lumijoki and Limingo parishes were unable to agree where the bor-
ders separating their parish forests were located. Representatives from both sides presented legal
documents with royal confirmation of the location of the border, which were both authenticated
by the court. However, both were advised not to request an examination of the borders since it
would only be costly and unnecessarily time-consuming. They were instead urged to maintain
peace and reach an agreement among themselves. They nevertheless insisted on having the borders
properly inspected to avoid ending up in a similar situation again.17
15Sommarting, Kelviå parish, 28th of February 1664, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1661-66, RR.11, pp. 554v–555.
16Sommarting, Kelviå parish, 28th of February 1664, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1661–62, RR.11, pp. 554v–555.
17Vinterting, Limingbo parish, the 17th & 18th of January 1665, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1661–66, RR.11, pp. 660v–661.
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The establishment or re-establishment of borders could be a recurring event even though legal
documents (synebrev, lit. inspection letters) existed. Laymen and representatives of the court and
local community, who were sometimes accompanied by trusted individuals from neighbouring
parishes, attended the inspection to utilise as much of the peasant communities’ expertise as possible
and to guarantee a fair examination.18 The inspection letters also provided legal precedent, as they
often contained settlements and terms if future border violations were to occur. These terms often
included reimbursement of that which had been cut (tar wood, timber, firewood) through the
exchange of finished products (tar or planks).19 The crossing of the border itself, especially if it
had been done with malicious intent, could lead to the establishment of graduated sanctions in
the form of added penalty fees. One such example from 1683 concerned the peasants living on
the island Manamansalo in Ule träsk. Covering an area of almost 75 square kilometres, its forest
seems to have been extensive but was also assaulted by peasants from a village on the mainland.
While the borders in a forest landscape could be difficult to define, 12 kilometres of water separated
these villages, which accentuated the malicious intent of the intruders. A pre-existing settlement
from 1679 stated that each household on the island would be given three barrels of tar in case of
another violation, which now had to be provided. The penalty fee was also updated to include 40
silver marks if repeated.20
One might ask, then, if it would not have been easier to physically divide the forests. The answer is
that a physical division of the forests would probably have led to an unfair distribution of forest
resources. It is known that the properties of the environmental context could motivate cooperation
(Beltrán Tapia, 2015). The biophysical conditions were such that different parts of the forests con-
tained resources that were used for different purposes, such as tar wood, wood for shipbuilding,
planks, building timber, and firewood. Furthermore, since sections of the forest had already been
cut by the middle of the century, one peasant could be allotted an area rich in tar wood while another
might be allotted barely anything. By maintaining the common and sharing responsibility, peasants
were given advantages of scale that had considerable benefits in the face of market forces and raised
taxes. Since certain tasks of tar production needed the whole household as well as assistance from
one’s neighbours, cooperation was a strong motivating factor and included monitoring of the forests.
Taking into account the different problems and disputes that could occur and how peasants dealt
with them, it was evident, however, that keeping forests clear of intruders was sometimes hard
but was also vital to ensure the longevity of the management system. The borders of the forests
were meant to be inviolable, and infringements were taken very seriously. Although the outcomes
of inspections and settlements were sometimes disregarded, most were respected.
Local communities and central institutions
The substantial quantity of tar that eventually found its way to Amsterdam and London had come by
trading ships from Stockholm in the keels of the Northern Tar Company (Norrländska Tjärkompa-
niet), which was founded in 1648. The company was tasked with keeping the average price of tar at a
maximum level in the Western European market through quality control, standardising products,
and limited supply. Since they had a monopoly on the trade, the company alone set the prices at
which burgher classes could sell their tar (Hallberg, 1959). Depending on quality and buyer, the
value of one barrel was three and a half copper daler in the latter part of the seventeenth century.21
Considering the calculations provided by Villstrand (1992) and Virrankoski (1973) on the level of
18See for example Häradsting, Lochteå parish, 4th and 5th of August 1651, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1650–52, RR.7, p. 330.
19See for example Vinterting, Paltamo parish, 5th, 6th, and 7th of February 1683, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1683–, RR.20,
pp. 109–110.
20Vinterting, Paltamo parish, 5th, 6th, and 7th of February 1683, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1683–, RR.20, pp. 109–110.
21See for example Vinterting, Friherreskapet Ikalaborg, the 31st of January & 1st of February 1667, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1667–
71, RR.12, p. 9; Vinterting, Limingo parish, the 13th, 14th, 15th, & 16th February 1699, NAF, Court Records, PP, 1699–, RR.36,
p. 351.
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taxation, at least ten barrels of tar needed to be produced and sold annually by each peasant house-
hold in Salo parish. However, court records show that tar production could be far more extensive.
One court case from the barony of Ikalaborg in 1667 revealed that the peasant Joseph Tomasson had
delivered 107 barrels to a burgher for which he had not been paid in full. The value of the tar was
estimated to be three and a quarter per barrel, which would amount to a value of almost 350 copper
dalers.22 While it is difficult to estimate, approximately 30 barrels of tar could be produced per square
kilometre (Villstrand, 1992), meaning that Joseph’s tar production would have consumed three and a
half square kilometres of forest. Such levels of exploitation were exceptional and rare to find in the
court material but would nevertheless explain how the resource and commodity frontier came to
move inland during the early modern period.
Tar was sold at markets in the town squares where peasants could freely choose their buyer. How-
ever, the trade and credit system (majmiseriet) gradually tied the peasants closer to individual bur-
ghers. This was a business agreement in which peasants went directly to a burgher with whom they
had struck a long-term deal that included lodgings, food, and drink for the duration of the peasant’s
stay (Jutikkala, 1963; Villstrand, 2011).23 Being tied to a burgher was not a practise limited to the
Finnish part of the realm. Similar trade agreements existed in Bergslagen and in the town of
Falun in the county of Dalarna, where peasants regularly delivered charcoal to mine owners, who
often granted credits to peasants (Karlsson, 1990; Bladh, 1997; Ågren, 1998b). Burghers were in
any case the intermediary between the peasant and the international market, creating a relationship
of mutual dependence.
According to the Country Law of Christopher from 1442, trade in the countryside was only
allowed between peasants. Even though it became increasingly difficult to uphold this constraint
during the early modern period, local authorities generally succeeded in concentrating trade in
the towns (Jutikkala, 1963). The burghers’ role in the relationship of exploitation and their impact
on the sustainability of Finland’s forests was primarily indirect in so far as they eagerly bought as
much as they could of what the peasants delivered. Additionally, they frequently complained over
the infrequency of deliveries and that they were too small or of bad quality.24 Illegal appropriation
committed by burghers and illegal deals between them and peasants concerning forest access were
also present in the records, which certainly had impact as well;25 however, the extent of the impact
was probably negligible compared with that of the peasantry. Establishing ownership rights was also
easier in comparison with conflicts between peasants since the burghers, unlike the landholding pea-
sants, had none. Conflicts between the urban and rural domains were also one of the few kind cases
where the peasantry was supported by the crown.
Forests represented and shaped the cultural and symbolic bonds between peasants, which estab-
lished a sense of communality within the local community. Nonetheless, forests also became an
economic business venture that outside economic forces soon realised were worth betting money
on. However, while there were financial profits to be made, those profits had to be collected long-
term. This was the attitude assumed by the Swedish crown.
As in other European countries, the exploitation of forests gave birth to a growing fear within the
central government that they were being completely cut down. Paul Warde (2018) explained how
forest scarcity was a universally proclaimed fear in Europe at this time, which prompted widespread
legislative actions to be made, especially in the sixteenth century. In Denmark, where woodlands had
been gradually used up by the late seventeenth century, serious difficulties with the provision of fuel
resources and timber were felt, which incited the government to institute several forest ordinances
22Vinterting, Friherreskapet Ikalaborg, the 31st of January & 1st of February 1667, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1667–71, RR.12, p. 9.
23A survey from 1679 showed that eight out of ten peasants were bound to a burgher in northern Finland, resulting in a situation
where only a few burghers controlled the entire tar trade in the region. Villstrand (2011).
24See for example Vinterting, Uleåborg and Karlö parishes, the 13th, 14th, 15th, & 16th of February 1682, NAF, Court Records, PPEP,
1682–, RR.19, p. 274; Vinterting, Kalajoki parish, the 22nd and 23rd of March 1662, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1686–, RR.23,
p. 235–236.
25See for example Sommarting, Karlö Friherreskap, the 22nd of July 1658, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1657–58, RR.10, p. 428.
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during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Kjærgaard, 1994). In Finland, earlier research has
committed to the challenge of estimating the exploitation of wood in North Ostrobothnia and
arrived at the conclusion that it is very difficult. While the yearly extraction rate was certainly
high, there was never a real danger of total deforestation. It did, however, affect the biomass in
such a manner that the commodity frontier linked to the tar industry and the widely growing
pine gradually moved inland, leaving room for spruce (Picea abies) to spread throughout the region
(Villstrand, 1992). Local shortages of pine forest did occur, and the development was most certainly a
consequence of the tar industry’s consumption of wood. The forest policies implemented by the
Swedish state were, however, poorly rooted in the reality experienced by peasants in their day-to-
day work, and these policies were seldom adhered to by the local population.
The ports and towns functioned as hubs for state intervention and inspection of trading activities
between the rural and urban populations. However, overseeing and directly regulating forest cutting
in rural areas was an overpowering task that authorities seldom succeeded in. The first Royal Forest
Ordinance was issued in 1647, followed by a second in 1664. Their main purpose was to regulate the
conflicting needs of the agrarian industries and the mining industry’s dependency on charcoal (Bäck,
1982). However, applied to the conditions in North Ostrobothnia, threats of abolishing the peasants’
right to freely use the forests became a common strategy used by officials. One such regulation was
limiting tar production to 24 barrels of tar per household per year. This restriction was, however,
seldom followed, as there were examples of peasants producing up to 120 barrels in one year (Vill-
strand, 1992). A similar example was found in the court records concerning forest cutting. In January
1673, the governor of Kronoby expressed his concern over the cutting of timber, planks, tar wood,
firewood, and swidden in the parish. He required the constable Erich Matsson and layman Nils
Matsson to provide a complete written account of how much each household had cut during the
previous year by examining how much timber had been sawn at the local sawmills. Additionally,
customs officer Tawast was compelled to examine his books over exported timber logs.26 Records
such as those provided by Tawast could be decisive when the state wanted to prosecute peasants
for what they believed to be excessive forest cutting. The sawmill reports and Tawast’s accounts
appeared to correspond well and gave an estimation of the extent of exploitation and exports
from Kronoby harbour in 1673. The peasants had exceeded the permissible amount of 2843 timber
logs by 1767, resulting in a total of 4610 logs in one year. The average yearly number of logs cut per
household was approximately 120.27
An important aspect of any enforcement of forest regulations is to know the quantity of existing
resources before implementing them. Numerous ordinances were introduced in Sweden, and their
implementation in North Ostrobothnia stands out. As mentioned earlier, local authorities liberally
interpreted their content and formulated rules based on lacking knowledge about how much exploi-
table forests actually existed or how much resources were consumed (the example above serving as
an exception). Furthermore, while population growth in combination with state consumption
rapidly exhausted Denmark’s forests, the Swedish case developed differently. Here, the local popu-
lation’s forest cutting, the international market’s demand for forest products, and the increasing
levels of taxation and conscription enforced by the Swedish state created an engine that raised the
level of wood consumption throughout the seventeenth century and brought it to an all-time high
in the 1770s (Villstrand, 1992). Regardless of the growing number of forest regulations implemented
by the Swedish state towards the end of the century, exports steadily increased.
It can be argued that the authorities’ fear of wood shortage created a problem that motivated their
involvement because ‘without a problem, there could be no government’ (Warde, 2006, p. 167). The
mode of exploitation adopted by the Swedish state was to utilise the growing international demand
for tar while at the same time keeping forest cutting at a level they believed to be sustainable. The
26Vinterting, Kronoby parish, the 18th and 20th of August 1673, NAF, Court Records, PPEP, 1672–74, RR.13, pp. 352v–353.
27It must be stressed that there are probably hidden statistics that were not accounted for in these reports since peasants generally
cut wood for purposes other than the production of timber logs for export.
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peasantry was expected to pay their taxes and limit their private consumption of forest resources to a
bare minimum. These efforts were, however, continuously ignored by the local population.
Conclusion: Finland in a European context
The findings presented in this article demonstrate a development where increasing tar production
and widespread forest cutting led to changes in the regulation of forest commons and to formalisa-
tion of borders and customary practices during the seventeenth century in North Ostrobothnia. The
gradual increase in forest-related conflicts and how the local communities responded to the growing
number of border violations and illicit forest cutting revealed both similarities and differences in how
common-pool institutions were organised in a wider European context. Similar rules, such as not
appropriating more resources than a household needed for its survival, can be found in the western
part of Sweden as well as in several places in Europe (Birrell, 1987; Granér, 2002; Winchester, 2015).
The custom of keeping to one’s ancient harvest area was, however, increasingly disregarded in North
Ostrobothnia, and the communal parish forests were exploited at an intensified rate. This required
and encouraged peasants to take collective action by formalising already existing rules through the
mandate of the local courts rather than by establishing new rules by means of modernisation, as has
been observed in early modern southwestern Germany (Grüne, 2011). The non-physical division of
forests was a solution that motivated community members to maintain and respect the formalised
rules, reduced uncertainty, and created greater stability.
Borders and their whereabouts were an issue partly deriving from disregarded informal rules but
also from the need to expand the level of forest cutting as the century progressed. Establishing and
re-establishing the location of the borders was frequently requested by the peasantry, and the con-
sequent inspections provided them with legal documents that solidified their fluidity. This develop-
ment was very different from that of Falvey’s case (2013), which showed that English commoners
strongly opposed solidification of borders, and can be explained by the high level of self-governance
enjoyed by Finnish peasants. It was a tool and strategy that peasants could use to suit their will. Berg-
slagen and the western part of Sweden followed a more similar development to that of North Ostro-
bothnia, where the establishment of borders became increasingly important and sought after,
although it was driven by different incentives. The advantages of scale, which was a motivating factor
for the Finnish peasants, as well as for the peasant communities in other places in Europe (de Moor,
2009; Beltrán Tapia, 2015), were undermined in western Sweden, where the state and ironwork own-
ers exerted their influence by controlling commoners’ use of their forest commons (Granér, 2002;
Jansson, 2003).
The peasants shared many interests with the burghers, giving birth to the trade and credit system
of majmiseriet, which had similar characteristics to the bonds between peasants and ironwork own-
ers in Bergslagen. It did, however, create conflicts when burghers illegally appropriated forest
resources and sometimes drove wedges between peasants through illegal deals for forest access,
something that was condemned by local authorities. The role played by the Swedish state was double
sided. The state had conflicting motives: to limit the peasantry’s personal consumption of forest
resources while raising the tax burden and revenues through increased exports of forest products.
The Royal Forest Ordinances were initially formulated with regard to the development in western
Sweden but were also implemented in Finland due to local authorities’ fear of total deforestation,
a trend that can be observed across Europe from the sixteenth century onwards (Warde, 2018).
The balance of power was nonetheless such that the crown could not control the peasantry even
though attempts were made. This sets the development in North Ostrobothnia apart from that in
western Sweden as well as from other parts of Europe considering the vastness of the region and
the extent of forest resources that the peasantry could exploit.
Even though the enclosures of later centuries ultimately led to privatisation of common lands,
common-pool regimes endured throughout the seventeenth century. The intensified exploitation
of forest resources nevertheless moved the resource and commodity frontier and compelled peasant
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communities to formalise customs and rules in relation to how the forests were used, who used them
and the extent to which they were used. How the management of forests changed in later centuries
and whether it followed a similar trajectory to that of western Sweden and other parts of Europe is
still a question that needs to be addressed. It is, however, clear that the development in North Ostro-
bothnia was both similar and unique when contrasted to how forests were managed in pre-modern
Europe.
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